2024

We were all set to write up a scintillating and detailed analysis of the New Jersey Appellate Division’s opinion in Englewood Hospital & Med. Center v. New Jersey, No. A-2767-21 (June 27, 2024), when we thought, ah, why not just ask you to read our New Jersey colleague Joe Grather’s scintillating and detailed analysis.

Short story is right there in the title of this post. As Joe puts it:

In short, the hospitals argued that requiring them to provide charity care and Medicaid care at a loss was an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation.  The trial court analyzed the claims as an “as-applied” challenge.  Therefore, it dismissed some of the claims because of a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  The “slightly different reason” was that the Appellate Court found the claims were a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, and therefore it analyzed the takings claims under the familiar rubric of whether there was a “direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property,” or an “uncompensated regulatory interference with a property owner’s interest in their property.” Slip op. at 14.

No physical taking, no Penn Central taking. We recommend you read his entire post “As We Approach Our Nation’s Birthday, a New Jersey Appellate Court Rejects Hospitals’ Takings Claims.”

Joe ends it this way: “I bet the hospitals are preparing their petition for certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court now.  Happy 4th of July!”

That means to stay tuned for more.

Englewood Hospital & Med. Center v. New Jersey, No. A-2767-21 (N.J. App. Div. June 27, 2024)

Continue Reading New Jersey: Forcing Hospital To Provide Care At A Loss Isn’t A Taking

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Join us next week with ALI-CLE for “Property Rights and Regulatory Takings at the Supreme Court.” We’ve assembled legal experts including counsel in the Sheetz and DeVillier Supreme Court cases, and a dirt law legal scholar to discuss these important decisions and answer your questions (including “what’s next?”):

The 2023-24 Supreme Court term has been another one of significance in the world of property rights. In particular, two unanimous cases directly addressed takings: Sheetz v. County of El Dorado, 601 U.S. __ (2024) (holding that the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative land-use permit conditions) and DeVillier v. Texas, 601 U.S. __ (2024) (holding that property owners adversely affected by a flood evacuation barrier should be permitted on remand to pursue their takings clause claims through the cause of action available under Texas law).

To better understand the importance of these…

Continue Reading Join Us July 16, 2024: ALI-CLE’s Webcast: “Property Rights and Regulatory Takings at the Supreme Court”

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The famous corner of India and Milk, Boston
(at least for takings nerds)

Today, along with our friend and colleague Hawaii eminent domain lawyer Mark M. Murakami, we filed this Application for a Writ of Certiorari* in a condemnation case that has been pending for more than a decade (including more than five years in the court of appeals). We posted about the case — including an aerial video of the property, located on Maui’s south shore — here.

The Question Presented:

May a jury determining just compensation consider evidence of the influence of the condemnation on the fair market value of property being taken?

You eminent domain types know the answer to this: No.

Indeed, no way! If you thought the “project influence” rule is a baseline requirement of the Fifth Amendment, a rule applied by courts nationwide, and for ages has held that “any…

Continue Reading New (State Court) “Project Influence” Cert Petition* – Inadmissibility Of Evidence Of Use & Value Of Property As Condemned

Worth reading: a student-authored piece in the latest issue of the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, “Original Understanding of ‘Background Principles’ in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid.“

From the Introduction:

But in Cedar Point, when considering a regulation that authorized union organizers to enter certain businesses, the Court held that even a temporary physical occupation was a per se taking requiring compensation.

The Court’s shift to a per se rule is significant because it means a landowner can receive “just compensation” without satisfying Penn Central’s high bar required for regulatory takings. For governments, the Cedar Point holding could pose a heavy financial burden if they must compensate landowners for temporary intrusions authorized under existing regulations. Due to this imposing financial burden, some have suggested that Cedar Point threatens existing civil rights regimes, which at first blush resemble the labor rights regulation at…

Continue Reading New Article: “Original Understanding of ‘Background Principles’ in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid“

Check this out, a local government has filed a cert petition seeking reversal of one of those relatively rare circumstances where the property owner won below on a temporary regulatory takings claim for the County’s denial of a development permit.

We won’t go into details on this, but urge you to read the petition, especially the Questions Presented:

In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, Cal., the Court held that the Fifth Amendment requires “just compensation” for temporary regulatory takings, i.e., “those regulatory takings which are ultimately invalidated by the courts.” 482 U.S. 304, 310 (1987). The appropriate compensation for a temporary regulatory taking is described as “fair value for the use of the property during this period of time.” Id. at 322. All claims for temporary regulatory takings must be analyzed using the ad-hoc, fact-based analysis set out in Penn Central Transp.

Continue Reading New Cert Petition: Gov’t Asks Whether A Penn Central Taking Is Really A Lucas Taking

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It’s not quite “Yes Virginia…” but here is our annual Independence Day missive on the legal angle on the Declaration. This may have special significance as the nation is in the process of reexamining many of our assumptions and history. But though the Founders may have been flawed individuals — as we all are — there’s really no question about the ideas they captured, and, thankfully, put down on for posterity.

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We know lawyers are easy targets (we enjoy lawyer jokes as much as the next person, i.e., What’s the difference between a good lawyer and a great lawyer? A good lawyer knows the law; a great lawyer knows the judge.).

Nonetheless, as we celebrate our independence, we note that author Thomas Jefferson and 23 other of the 56 signers of the Declaration of Independence were lawyers, and that the document was crafted and understood fundamentally

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Continue Reading The Verified Complaint In Equity: The Declaration Of Independence, v.248

We were all set to write up the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Sojenhomer LLC v. Village of Egg Harbor, No. 2021AP1589 (June 19, 2024) — after all, we were already following the case — when Lawprof Ilya Somin beat us to the punch: “Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules Sidewalks are not “Pedestrian Ways” – thus Allowing Local Governments to Use Eminent Domain to Take Property to Build Them.”

Short story is that a Wisconsin statute prohibits using eminent domain to take property for a “pedestrian way,” and the Village instituted a condemnation action to take Sojenhomer’s property for a sidewalk. No way, you say?

Yes way held the Wisconsin court. The key was that pedestrian way was a defined statutory term, and thus not subject to common meanings (which would seem to include a sidewalk as a pedestrian way). The court concluded that the sidewalk did…

Continue Reading When Is A Sidewalk Not — You Know — A “Pedestrian Way”? Wisconsin Supreme Court Clues Us In

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Here’s the latest in a case (and issue) we’ve been following closely.

In Watson Memorial Spiritual Temple of Christ v. Korban, No. 24-0055 (June 28, 2024), the Louisiana Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Court of Appeal, concluding the duty to actually pay just compensation for a taking is ministerial. 

That may not seem like an earth-shattering conclusion. After all, since at least 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court has labeled the Just Compensation Clause as “self-executing” which means that if there’s been a taking, there must be compensation. Must means must. At least that’s what it means to us.

But as readers of this blog know, you can get a final judgment for inverse condemnation from a Louisiana court, but the defendant/taker retains the discretion whether to actually pay it, and the usual judgment-enforcement procedures are not available. That comes from this provision…

Continue Reading “A judgment for inverse condemnation, left unsatisfied, does not constitute the payment of just compensation.” Government Has A Ministerial Duty To Pay (And You Know What That Means)

The line between negligence torts and inverse condemnation can be a fine one. In Roman Realty, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 220587 (June 11, 2024), the West Virginia Supreme Court came down on the tort side.

Now before we go on, a caution: technically speaking the claimant did not assert an inverse condemnation claim. Rather, after the city removed trees and altered the slope of land such that surface water increased on the owner’s land, it brought a petition for mandamus to compel the city to institute eminent domain proceedings. There are places that approach it that way.

Here’s the gravamen of the petition:

In its verified petition for writ of mandamus to compel eminent domain proceedings, Petitioner alleged that during project construction, eleven trees were removed from its property and “approximately 1,000 square feet of Petitioner’s property was excavated and used as a dump site.” Additionally…

Continue Reading WVa: Tort, Not Inverse (At Least Where Municipalities Are Involved)

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If you know, you know.

Sad birthday wishes to our most un-favorite decision ever, Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), which turns 45 today.

Time has not treated the opinion well. Practitioners, judges, and legal scholars across the spectrum have called the three-factor Penn Central test for an ad hoc regulatory taking “demanding,” “fuzzy,” a four-part test, “neither defensible as a matter of theory nor mandated as a matter of precedent,” and “problematic” and “mysterious.” Courts mess up the basic meaning of the factors, treat what is supposed to be a fact-centric “ad hoc” test as a legal question decided on the pleadings, and gatekeep most of these cases from juries.

The definitive deconstruction of the case was Professor Gideon Kanner’s “Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century …

Continue Reading Unhappy 45th Birthday, Penn Central