Inverse condemnation

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The $37 million inverse condemnation judgment against the City of Half Moon Bay, California by  the US District Court for the Northern District of California is having some repercussions, as reported by the San Francisco Chronicle:

Under the worst-casescenario, officials say, Half Moon Bay would become the first Bay Areacity forced to dissolve, and the coastal town’s land would become anunincorporated part of San Mateo County.

Members of the City Council say that’s unlikely, and they plan tovote at a public meeting tonight to retain an appellate law firm and afinancial consultant to advise them on how to tackle a court judgmentthat is more than three times Half Moon Bay’s $10 million annual budget.

. . .

Funding such a bond wouldmean “significant budget cuts across the board,” the City Council saidin a joint statement last week. “Everything will be affected – parks,streets, libraries, repairs – every municipal function will…

Continue Reading Government’s Response to $37M Inverse Condemnation Judgment

There’s an interesting discussion going on over at The Volokh Conspiracy about the recent $37 million inverse condemnation/regulatory takings federal judgment against the City of Half Moon Bay, California.  I wrote about the decision here and here. 

The comments to Professor Somin’s post are particularly thought-provoking, especially the ones dealing with whether the decision is an “inverse condemnation” case or a “regulatory takings” case.  On one hand, government causing flooding on private property is a classic inverse condemnation situation; the intrusion of water onto private property is the equivalent of the government taking a flowage easement, so it is required to pay fair value for it.  That’s what happened in the Half Moon Bay case.  On the other hand, the “wipeout” of economically beneficial uses and a “physical invasion” are two per se categories of regulatory takings, both of which also occurred in the case. 

So the case is…

Continue Reading What’s the Difference Between “Inverse Condemnation” and a “Regulatory Taking?”

Two updates on Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay, No. 05-4149 VRW (Nov. 28, 2007), the $37 million inverse condemnation judgment about which I posted here.  In that case, the US District Court for the Northern District of California held the city liable for ataking after it caused the plaintiff’s property to flood, whichrendered it an undevelopable “wetland.”  You flood it, you bought it.

First, Gideon Kanner posts his latest comments on the ripeness argument made by the city, and a recent write up of the case in the LA lawyer’s daily paper, the Los Angeles Daily Journal. 
Professor Kanner writes about the city’s post-trial argument that the case belonged in state court under the Williamson County ripeness doctrine (federal takings claims must be brought first in state courts).  As I mentioned, the case was originally brought by the plaintiff in state court, but was removed…

Continue Reading In Ripeness Doctrine, What’s Good For the Goose is Not Necessarily Good for the Gander

Update: More on the case here and here.  Professor Gideon Kanner’s take on the case here.

Update 3/2008: The parties have settled.

Check out the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law  issued by the US District Court for the Northern District of California in Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay, No. 05-4149 VRW (Nov. 28, 2007).  No need to digest all 167-pages: the bottom line is that the court awarded a judgment of $36.8 million because the city caused the plaintiff’s property to become wetlands, and rendered it undevelopable. 

The court held that the city was liable for inverse condemnation under both California and federal law, and that the compensation to be awarded to the landowner was difference in the value of the property before the taking, compared to after.  The court also held the city liable for common law nuisance and…

Continue Reading No. Cal. Federal Court Whacks City for $36.8m Inverse Condemnation Award

Thanks to both Patty Salkin’s Law of the Land blog and Gideon Kanner’s Gideon’s Trumpet, we’ve been alerted to a regulatory takings case from the Georgia Supreme Court that presents an unusual fact pattern.  In Mann v. Georgia Dep’t of Corrections, No. S07A1043 (Nov. 21, 2007), the court struck down as an illegal taking a Georgia law that prohibited convicted sex offenders from living within 1,000 feet of a school or child care facility. 

Mann, an offender, was living legally in a home he owned, when a child care facility located within 1,000 feet.  The Department of Corrections ordered Mann to leave upon pain of arrest.  Professor Salkin summarizes the case here, and Professor Kanner adds his analysis here.  They both sum up the facts and holding of the case very thoroughly. 

The court noted that the effect of the Georgia statute wasnot simply to interfere…

Continue Reading Law That Requires Sex Offender Move From Home is a Regulatory Taking

The US Court of Federal Claims (CFC) is the court assigned jurisdiction under the Tucker Act to hear inverse condemnation and regulatory takings claims against the federal government where the remedy sought is money damages.  The CFC is an “article I” court meaning its judges do not have life tenure as do judges of article III courts, but aside from that and its limited jurisdiction, it functions very much like the district courts.  Appeal of the CFC is taken to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  Here is a rundown of a few of the court’s recent decisions involving takings issues:

Contract is not “property” — Griffin Broadband Communications, Inc. v. United States, No. 06-898C (Nov. 19, 2007).  The court dismissed a takings claim based on a contract between the plaintiff and the Army to provide TV and communication services at Fort Irwin, California.  After 10…

Continue Reading Court of Federal Claims Takings Roundup

In Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court of Arizona,No. 05-17063 (Nov. 15, 2007), the Ninth Circuit held that Arizona’s”low bono” requirement that all attorneys serve as arbitrators for $75per day, maximum two days, is not a taking.  It’s probably safe tosurmise that the plaintiff’s position probably received little sympathyoutside of certain members of the Bar:

Mark V.Scheehle, an Arizona tax lawyer, challenges as an unconstitutionaltaking the Arbitrator Appointment System of the Maricopa CountySuperior Court (“Appointment System”), which requires that anexperienced attorney serve as an arbitrator for up to two days a yearwith minimal compensation.  Following a decision by the Arizona SupremeCourt that the Appointment System was permissible under Arizona law,the district court reaffirmed its grant of defendants’ motion forsummary judgment. We now affirm. We hold that Scheehle’s constitutionalchallenge to the Appointment System is properly considered under theregulatory takings test set forth in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City…

Continue Reading Ninth Circuit: No Taking for Forced Attorney Low Bono* Labor

The Court has posted the transcript of today’s oral argument in the John R. Sand and Gravel Co. v. United States appeal here. 

The Supreme Court will decide whether the statute of limitations in inverse condemnation actions against the United States under the Tucker Act is “jurisdictional” or may be waived by the defendant.  More about the case, including a summary and the briefs of the parties and amici here.Continue Reading Transcript of Oral Arguments in Tucker Act Statute of Limitations Case

A must-read decision today from the Ninth Circuit — Crown Point Development, Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, No. 06-35189 (Nov. 1, 2007).  The court clarified a point that has been a long time coming: a property owner may assert claims under both the Takings and the Due Process Clauses.  In other words, land use guys, the court has finally torpedoed Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). 

Armendariz stood for the unusual proposition that a property owner’s claim for violations of substantive due process rights were “subsumed” within the owner’s claim for violation of the Takings Clause.  Thus, in land-related issues, a property owner could only bring takings claims.

Sun Valley rejected Crown Point’s development application.  Afterpursuing relief in state court, Crown Point filed a federal civil rights actionpursuant to 42 USC § 1983, alleging that Sun Valley arbitrarilyinterfered with its property rights…

Continue Reading ▪ Ninth Circuit: Landowner May Assert Both Takings and Due Process Claims

Cornell Law School’s Legal Information Institute has posted a comprehensive summary and analysis of the the arguments in the upcoming John R. Sand & Gravel v. United States appeal, scheduled for oral argument in the US Supreme Court on November 6, 2007.  The issue, as I posted about here, is whether the six year statute of limitations in the Tucker Act is “jurisdictional.”

The merits and amicus briefs discussed in the LII’s summary have been posted on the ABA’s Supreme Court preview site:  Petitioner’s briefUS government’s briefamicus brief of Pacific Legal Foundationamicus brief of the National Association of Homebuilders. Continue Reading ▪ Summary of John R. Sand & Gravel Case: Is the Statute of Limitations in Federal Inverse Condemnation Cases Jurisdictional?