Here’s the recording of the March 20, 2017 oral arguments in Murr v. Wisconsin, the e “larger parcel” or “denominator” case.
The printed transcript is posted here, and our summary of the arguments is posted here. Our preview of the arguments, which includes link to the briefs, is here.
Under Nebraska law, Natural Resource Districts possess the power of eminent domain, delegated to them by the state legislature. The question in Estermann v. Bose, No. S-15-1022 (Apr. 7, 2017) was whether four of those NRD’s could, in turn, re-delegate that power to a new agency which they jointly formed under the Interlocal Cooperation Act, a Nebraska statute which allows such things.
This new agency — the only-could-be-named-by-government “N-CORPE” (Nebraska Cooperative Republican Platte Enhancement) — was formed to regulate and manage water to comply with the Republican River Compact. Part of its duties included a “stream flow augmentation project” to manage ground and surface water, a portion of which required it to institute condemnation proceedings to take a portion of Estermann’s land for a flowage easement.
In a separate lawsuit, Estermann sued, seeking an injunction prohibiting the taking because N-CORPE did not possess the power of eminent domain.
Honolulu Civil Beat has an interesting editorial today about the Honolulu rail project, the 20-station, 21-mile elevated steel-on-steel project now being built at a cost that was first projected at about $3.8 billion, and at last count is somewhere in the $8 – $11 billion range.
The editorial, “Honolulu Rail: City Needs To Get It Together Or Give It Up,” posits that the “perpetually beleaguered rail project is still at least $2 billion short,” and “the absence of any decisive leadership … leav[es] taxpayers on ‘a never ending hook.'” The City, the piece argues, needs to get its act together, because the people, “are by no means past the point of no return,” and substantially modifying, or even killing the project and rebooting should not be ruled out.
In our opinion, none of that will happen. Now that we are past the recent election — yet another
Here’s what we’re reading this Friday:
Continue Reading Friday Round-Up: Murr Arguments, Exactions Cert Petition, Houston “Zoning”
Here’s the cert petition, docketed yesterday, in a case we’ve been following on legislatively-imposed permit exactions, an issue in dire need of Supreme Court resolution.
Here’s the Question Presented:
A City of West Hollywood ordinance requires that builders of a proposed 11-unit condominium pay a $540,393.28 “affordable housing fee” to subsidize the construction of low-cost housing elsewhere in the City. The ordinance imposes the fee automatically as a condition on the approval of a building permit, without any requirement that the City show that the project
creates a need for low-cost housing.
The question presented is:
Whether a legislatively mandated permit condition is subject to scrutiny under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as set out in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
Stay tuned, folks.
No, this isn’t the Supreme Court, it’s Graceland,
purchased by Elvis in March 1957.
(We’re just checking whether you are paying attention.)
Appellate oral argument, as they say, is supposed to be a “conversation” between the bench and counsel. But the overall impression we were left with after reviewing the transcript of yesterday’s Supreme Court oral arguments in Murr v. Wisconsin, the case about the “larger parcel” or “denominator” in regulatory takings cases, was that just about everyone in the courtroom was talking on different wavelengths.
Don’t get us wrong — arguing counsel for all the parties and amicus did a pretty good job, in our view. They are advocates, after all, and their job is to champion their clients’ position, not to solve the Court’s confusion, and problems that appear entirely self-inflicted.
Two of the parties (the Murrs and the State of Wisconsin) urged the Court to adopt
For those of you, like us, who were not able to be in DC for today’s oral arguments in the “larger parcel” or “denominator” case, Murr v. Wisconsin (see our preview of the arguments here), here’s the transcript, hot off the press.
Transcript, Murr v. Wisconsin, No. 15-215 (Mar. 20, 2017)
Continue Reading Murr v. Wisconsin (Larger Parcel In Reg Takings) OA Transcript
As takings mavens are no doubt already aware, next Monday, the 8-Justice Supreme Court will hear arguments in Murr v. Wisconsin, the regulatory takings case which asks whether the county can avoid application of the Lucas wipeout standard on one parcel by taking advantage of the fact that the plaintiffs also own the adjacent parcel. Thus, the county argues, both parcels should be combined to determine how the regulation has impacted the property.
Others have done a better job at previewing the issues than we could hope to (see SCOTUSblog, the National Constitution Center, and the Federalist Society), so we won’t do a big summary here, but will limit ourselves to pointing out what we think will be the key areas of contention. Go read the voluminous briefing as well. And with the Court one-Justice-down for this case, we’re certainly not going to even venture
Here’s what we’re reading this Monday:
Can there be a more “Florida” name for a municipality than “Sunny Isles Beach?” Opinion may differ of course, but we think this one may take the prize.
That diversion aside, here’s today’s case. In City of Sunny Isles Beach v. Cavalry Corp., No. 3D15-1420 (Jan. 25, 2017), the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed an eminent domain judgment and an award of just compensation, concluding that the trial court was within its discretion when it allowed the landowner to present evidence of “conceptual” site plans to establish the property’s highest and best use.
The city took property for a bridge, and “[f]or all the years since the current owner acquired title to the property and before, there has been no effort by an owner to develop the canal property.” Slip op. at 3. But at trial, the owner “contended at trial, based upon conceptual site plans prepared by one of its
