Still not have your MCLE hours for 2010? Will you be in or near Plano, Texas on December 2 and 3, 2010? Want to attend a conference at which the top minds in planning, zoning and eminent domain law are speaking?

Well, you’re in luck. There’s still time to register for Planning, Zoning and Eminent Domain, sponsored by the Center for American and International Law.

It wasn’t overstatement when we said that this one has the big names: among those speaking are Dwight Merriam, Gideon Kanner, Robert Freilich, Bruce Kramer, Mike Berger, and Dan Mandelker. And that’s only a partial list of the luminaries. Dwight will also be announcing the 2010 ZiPLer Awards. We’ve been holding our breath on that one, since we nominated a case for one of the prizes.

Unfortunately, we can’t make it this year. But we’ve attended this conference before, and it’s

Continue Reading Upcoming Seminar: Planning, Zoning & Eminent Domain (Dec. 2-3, 2010)

We use “takings,” “Takings Clause” and “Fifth Amendment rights” as a convenient shorthand for the right of property owners to object or obtain compensation when a government act has so interefered with their rights that it might as well have exercised eminent domain. Every now and then, we need a reminder that the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment is not necessarily the last line of defense for property owners.

Today, in Interstate Companies, Inc v. City of Bloomington, No. A10-481 (Nov. 9, 2010), the Minnesota Court of Appeals provided the nudge. In that case, the court held that the Minnesota Constitution’s takings clause provides “broader protection to property owners than the federal constitution.” Slip op. at 6. The text of Minnesota Constitution is broader than the Fifth Amendment in that it provides that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without

Continue Reading Min App: Minnesota Constitution’s Takings Clause Provides Greater Protection For Property Owners

Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation, No. 09-846 (cert. granted Apr. 19, 2010), the case involving the scope of the Court of Federal Claims’ subject matter jurisdiction. The transcript of the argument  is posted here, and in a new feature, the Court has also released the audio recording (28mb mp3) in case you want to follow along, or just put in on your podcast list and listen to it on the way to work on Monday. 

Disclosure: we filed an amicus brief supporting the Tohono O’odham Nation.

At the heart of the case is 28 U.S.C. § 1500 which provides:

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall not have jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee has pending in any other court any suit or process against the United

Continue Reading SCOTUS Oral Argument Recording And Transcript In CFC Jurisdiction Case

Just in: the Texas Supreme Court has issued an opinion in Severance v. Patterson, No. 09-0378 (Nov. 5, 2010). In that case, the court ruled on “whether private beachfront properties on Galveston Island’s West Beach are impressed with a right of public use under Texas law without proof of an easement” when an avulsive event causes dramatic changes to a beach. Slip op. at 2.

The court concluded no, and answered these questions which were certified by the Fifth Circuit:

  • Does Texas recognize a “rolling” public beachfront access easement, i.e., an easement in favor of the public that allows access to and use of the beaches on the Gulf of Mexico, the boundary of which easement migrates solely according to naturally caused changes in the location of the vegetation line, without proof of prescription, dedication or customary rights in the property so occupied?
  • If Texas recognizes such an easement,


Continue Reading Texas: Public’s Beachfront Easement Does Not “Roll” With The Vegetation Line

The U.S. Supreme Court has declined to review Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State of Hawaii, 122 Haw. 34, 222 P.3d 441 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009). That’s the case in which the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals concluded that ownership of beachfront property includes only a partial right to accreted land.

The ICA held that held that “Act 73” (codifed here and here), the statute in which the Hawaii legislature redefined accretion as public property was a taking of existing accreted land, but held that Act 73 did not affect a taking of what it called “future” accretion, because the right is simply a contingent future interest and not a “vested” right. The Hawaii Supreme Court denied discretionary review.

Under the ICA’s view of “unvested future interests,” the legislature would be free to enact a statute abolishing the right to pass property to one’s heirs at death

Continue Reading Cert Denied In Hawaii Beach Taking Case

Slough Remember that now-iconic scene in The Fugitive, where Harrison Ford’s character has turned the tables on Tommy Lee Jones, and while holding Jones at gunpoint proclaims, “I didn’t kill my wife!”

Jones’ response — I don’t care! — could just as easily apply to regulatory takings law, especially where a property owner alleges a regulatory action results in a per se taking (either a Lucas interference with all economically beneficial use, or a deprivation of a fundamental aspect of property such as the right to exclude).

In those cases, it generally does not matter what justifications the government may have for the regulation — the only thing relevant is the impact of the regulation on the property. In other words, even a regulatory action that might be a very good idea (from the government’s perspective) results in liability for compensation if it results in a taking

Continue Reading Wash. App: “I Don’t Care!” – Regulatory Takings Are About Impact, Not Justification

40.10914_Page_1 The first task under the Supreme Court’s three-part test for an ad hoc regulatory taking under Penn Central is to measure the “economic impact of the regulation.” Professor Steven Eagle wrote in the recent edition of his treatise Regulatory Takings that “[d]iscerning the correct measure of economic impact has been the subject of much dispute.”

Thanks to the folks at the Environmental Law Institute, who have allowed us to reprint an article from a recent Environmental Law Reporter which brings some clarity to the subject.

In Federal Circuit’s Economic Failings Undo the Penn Central Test, William W. Wade, Ph.D., a resource economist with the firm Energy and Water Economics (Columbia, Tennessee), argues:

Faulty understanding of standard economic and financial analysis within regulatory takings cases continues to set this jurisprudence apart from standard tort cases, where state of the art economic methods typically are applied within both liability and

Continue Reading The Federal Circuit’s Economic Failings Undo The Penn Central Test

An opinion worth reading from the Missouri Court of Appeals on the relationship between an action in trespass and eminent domain. Sterbenz v. Kansas City Power and Light Co., No. WE71776 (Oct. 5, 2010) discusses the liability of a utility company for the installation of an underground utility line without an easement.

The Sterbenzes discovered that the utility company was installing a conduit on their land and informed the utility that it had no easement to do so. The utility offered to purchase an easement, but the Sterbenzes refused, and filed suit for trespass, among other claims. The utility countered by filing an eminent domain lawsuit against the Sterbenzes to condemn an easement. “The eminent domain action was stayed by agreement pending disposition of the Sterbenzes’ lawsuit. In fact, though not disclosed in the parties’ briefs, the record on appeal indicates that the parties stipulated to be bound by

Continue Reading Trespass And Eminent Domain Compared

Banner_300x68 Mark your calendars: as a follow up to the panel discussion of Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) at the ABA Annual Meeting in San Francisco in August, the ABA Section of Real Property, Trust and Estate Law is sponsoring (along with the Section on State & Local Government Law) a teleconference on the case and the issue of “judicial takings.”

In “Is There Such a Thing as a Judicial Taking? The Lessons of the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection,” I will be moderating a panel of legal experts to discuss the case, and more importantly, where we might go from here. Here’s a description of the program:

This program will discuss the 2010 United States Supreme Court decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Dept.


Continue Reading October 20, 2010: ABA Teleconference On Judicial Takings And The Stop The Beach Renourishment Case

Yesterday, on behalf of the Land Use Research Foundation of Hawaii, we filed this brief amicus curiae in the U.S. Supreme Court in Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. Hawaii, No. 10-331 (cert. petition filed Sep. 7, 2010). The Supreme Court’s docket entry on the case is here.

This is the case in which the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals concluded that ownership of beachfront property includes only a partial right to accreted land. In Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State of Hawaii, 122 Haw. 34, 222 P.3d 441 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009), the ICA held that held that “Act 73” (codifed here and here), the statute in which the legislature redefined accretion as public property was a taking of existing accreted land, but held that Act 73 did not affect a taking of what it called “future” accretion, because the right is simply a contingent future interest. The cert petition is available here.

The Cato Institute and Pacific Legal Foundation also filed an amicus brief urging the Court to review the case. See If Only Hawaii’s Government Were as Beautiful as Its Beaches.

The LURF amicus brief poses this Question Presented:

In 2003, the Hawaii legislature adopted Act 73, which declared that the private right to own accretion on beachfront parcels was public property. The statute did not provide for compensation, and upon challenge by the Petitioners, a state trial court invalidated Act 73 as a regulatory taking.

The Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii partially affirmed, concluding that Act 73 was a taking of accreted land in existence in 2003 when the Act became effective. It also concluded, however, that the statute was not a taking of “future accretion,” or land that might be accreted after 2003, because there was no certainty that accretion would occur, and littoral owners’ right to accretion was therefore not “vested.” The court concluded the legislature was free to recharacterize the private right to accretion as state property without compensation because Petitioners never owned it. In other words, the right to accretion is not “property” as that term is used in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The question presented is whether the right to accretion is property within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and therefore protected from ipse dixit redefinition into public property.

Here’s a summary of the brief:

To rescue Act 73 from total invalidity under the Takings Clause, the court below created a distinction never before recognized in Hawaii law between “vested existing accretions” which are constitutionally protected property, and “unvested future accretions,” which are not. The latter, the court concluded, could be transformed ipse dixit by the Hawaii legislature into public property without compensation. After all, how could a littoral owner possess a property interest in land that had not yet accreted?

The supposed distinction between “existing” and “future” accreted land is illusory, however, and overlooks the critical private property interest which Act 73 redefined as public property. Hawaii law had for over a century recognized that littoral owners possessed the right to accretion. That right was a present right, was “vested,” and, as surely as interest follows principal, cannot be transformed by the stroke of the legislature’s pen into public property. The Constitution – in addition to recognizing as property the accreted land in existence at the time of the adoption of Act 73 in 2003 – also protects the right to all accretion. Thus, when Act 73 declared that accretion belonged to the state, it confiscated private property without due process or condemnation, and violated the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments.

This brief focuses on two issues. First, the right to accretion is a present property interest protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from uncompensated legislative redefinition as public property. This right is not limited merely as accreted land in existence on the day the legislature adopted Act 73, and the court below strayed far afield from this Court’s established precedents when it concluded that the only property interest protected by the Constitution was the land already accreted. Second, to provide context to the lower court’s decision and how it reached its conclusion, this brief summarizes the decades-long experiences of Hawaii’s property owners who have seen their established common law property rights eroded into public property. The case at bar is only the latest example.

Brief at 3-4 (emphasis original) (footnote omitted).

The State of Hawaii has waived its right to file a brief in opposition (unless the Court orders a BIO be filed), and the case will be considered at the Court’s conference on October 29, 2010.

More to follow.

Continue Reading Amicus Brief In Hawaii Beach Takings Case: Is The Right To Accretion A “Property” Interest?