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We’ll be doing a longer post with our thoughts on the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Knick v. Township of Scott, No. 17-647 (June 21, 2019). But here’s the big picture.

It appears that at least five Justices finally seem to understand what we in the property bar have been saying for decades – that the essence of a federal “takings” claim against a local or municipal government is that “by regulation, you have deprived my property of ‘productive use’ [as Chief Justice Roberts noted on page 14 of the slip opinion], and you have not compensated me.” So it is enough that the government hasn’t paid me, and I have no obligation to “ripen” my federal claim by chasing down the local government for compensation in state court.

So nearly 100 years after Justice Holmes famously opined for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, …

Continue Reading Williamson County Overruled: After Nearly A Century, Supreme Court Finally Has Figured Out What A Regulatory Takings Claim Looks Like

One does knick meme

Property lawyers, dust off your Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and federal judges your long vacay from dealing with regulatory takings and inverse condemnation cases is over, because this just in: by a 5-4 margin (Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion, with Justice Kagan writing the dissent), the U.S. Supreme Court today finally (finally!) overruled the state-litigation prong of the Williamson County ripeness doctrine. Knick v. Township of Scott, No. 17-647 (June 21, 2019).

Yes, overruled. Not trimmed around the edges. Overruled. 

Here’s what our quick skim turns up as a critical passage:

The Court in Williamson County relied on statements in our prior opinions that the Clause “does not provide or require that compensation shall be actually paid in advance of the occupancy of the land to be taken. But the owner is entitled to reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation” after a taking.

Continue Reading “The state-litigation requirement of Williamson County is overruled.”

In Cranston Police Retirees Action Committee v. City of Cranston, No. 2017-36 (June 3, 2019), the Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that a municipal ordinance “the promulgated a ten-year suspension of the cost-of-living-adjustment (COLA) benefit for retirees of the Cranston Police Department and Cranston Fire Department who were enrolled in the City of Cranston’s pension plan” was not a taking of the pension plans’ members property.

Takings mavens should skip to page 27 of the opinion for the good stuff. First, the court assumed that the plan members possessed “property.” A COLA benefit, once vested, is property, and the parties did not challenge the trial court’s conclusion on that issue. Second, the court rejected the contention that the suspension of COLA benefits was a physical invasion or a Lucas economic wipeout. Slip op. at 30-31. This was a regulatory taking, analyzed under Penn Central‘s three-part ad hoc test.

Continue Reading RI: Ten-Year Suspension Of Pension’s COLA Adjustment Not A Penn Central Taking

A must-read for takings mavens. Property rights gurus Professor Gideon Kanner and Michael Berger have published a new article, The Nasty, Brutish, and Short Life of Agins v. Tiburon, 50 Urb. Lawyer 1 (2019). It’s the lead article in the latest volume of The Urban Lawyer, the law journal of our Section of the ABA, the Section of State and Local Government Law.

Barista’s note: since TUL ended its long-time editorial relationship with UMKC Law School last year, the journal has been published in-house, and we’ve taken on the role of Editor-in-Chief, in-between our lawyering and teaching day jobs. We recognize the efforts of our ABA editor, as well as our team of volunteer Associate Editors (our fellow lawyers who took on the responsibility of tech editing the pieces) in producing the journal. 

Kanner and Berger have written an informative (and entertaining) tour-de-force of modern regulatory takings law. …

Continue Reading New Must-Read Article: Kanner & Berger, “The Nasty, Brutish, and Short Life of Agins v. City of Tiburon”

With the opinion in the Knick v. Township of Scott case to drop as soon as Tuesday (we’re guessing the opinion will be by Chief Justice Roberts, by the way), hold on: we’re about to get super nerdy here. Impossibly nerdy. Yes, we’re revisiting the Star Trek analogies. We’ve been down this road before, even going so far as to have a colleague (who is perhaps even further down the rabbit hole than we are) present a takings CLE in his Starfleet uniform. 

The bottom line is this (and if you are not into Trek, you can stop right here): to us the key question which the Court is grappling with is whether a state’s judiciary is part of the state’s compensation system. If the majority of the justices conclude that it is, then don’t expect an out-and-out overruling of Williamson County, only a modest trim…

Continue Reading Shaka, When The Walls Fell: Yes, Knick Will Be About Takings, But It Will Be More About Federalism

Chicago wants to know where the food trucks it licenses to operate on city streets are. So it conditions the approval of a license on the operator installing a GPS device on the vehicle. 

In LMP Services, Inc. v. City of Chicago, No. 123123 (May 23, 2019), a case decided by the Illinois Supreme Court, the “[p]laintiff contends that the requirement that it install a GPS unit in its food truck and transmit its location to a service provider constitutes a warrantless search in violation of the Illinois Constitution.” Slip op. at 11. 

The court disagreed: food trucks are a highly-regulated business, and the government has a “substantial interest” in the ability to know where they are. You have to know where they are in order to inspect them, just like “brick and mortar” restaurants.

What about that case in which the U.S. Supreme Court held it was a…

Continue Reading It’s Not A Physical Intrusion On Property Rights To Condition Roach Coach License On GPS Installation

Short answer: no.

But the longer answer which lawprof Ilya Somin discusses in this short podcast is worth listening to. Check it out. 

Here’s the summary:

Over the last few years, taxi companies in several cities have brought lawsuits claiming that legalizing ride-share services such as Uber and Lyft violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, because it expropriates their supposed property right to a monopoly of the taxi business. Courts have so far rejected these arguments. But they raise broader issues about the nature of property rights, and what kinds of government actions qualify as a taking. Confusion about these matters goes well beyond this specific set of cases. Could treating government-created monopoly privileges as property rights imperil valuable innovations and reforms in many parts of the economy?

We follow the issue, mostly from an academic standpoint (we’ve yet to take on one of these cases, but find…

Continue Reading Lawprof: “Does Legalizing Uber and Lyft ‘Take’ The Property Of Taxi Companies?”

A law journal article worth reading (short, not too many distracting footnotes) on takings theory.

In Imperfect Takings, 46 Fordham Urban Law Journal 130 (2019), Professor Shai Stern writes about what he calls the “three safeguards” in eminent domain (due process, public use, and mandatory compensation), and how to evaluate the legality of takings when all three are not accomplished perfectly. He argues that his balancing model “allows the government to exercise its expropriation power properly even in imperfect circumstances, while still sufficiently protecting property owners and society from abuse of that power.”

Our thinking: in our experience, none of the bars for the three safeguards are all that high, so we are not convinced this model is new. Because this is what courts already do, no? In Kelo for example, the majority mostly shrugged its shoulders at a stricter reading of the public use requirement because it was…

Continue Reading New Article: Imperfect Takings

The Arizona Corporations Commission has authority to regulate the sale, lease, assigning, mortgage of a public utility’s assets, including when those assets are “otherwise dispose[d] of.” These transactions need the Commission’s approval. 

The city intended to exercise eminent domain to take the assets of a water utility. This sure looked like a “friendly” condemnation: the city and the utility entered into a letter of intent “documenting the City’s intent to condemn substantially all the assets” of the utility, and “negotiations between the City and [the utility] were intended to result in condemnation, not a sale.”

But the city and the utility did not seek Commission approval. A developer objected, asserting the municipality’s condemnation of the utility was covered by the “otherwise dispose of” language. The Commission agreed, concluding that it could regulate the condemnation, and ordered it to be halted until the Commission approved it. 

In City of Surprise v. Arizona …

Continue Reading Arizona: Eminent Domain Isn’t Voluntary (Even A “Friendly” Condemnation)

Thanks to Professor Michael Wara’s Twitter feed, here is what might possibly be the first and only example of a comic strip devoted to inverse condemnation.

Yes, it is on an advocacy site (the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 1245), and it doesn’t really go into the details of the doctrine, but come on, what did you expect? Just sit back and enjoy.

Continue Reading California Inverse Condemnation And Wildfires: The Comic