Penn Central

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Here’s the cert petition filed last week which asks the Supreme Court to review the Federal Circuit’s unpublished opinion in Mehaffy v. United States (Dec. 10, 2012). In that case, the court affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ grant of summary judgment to the government, holding that Mehaffy failed the Penn Central test solely because he purchased the property alleged to have been taken after the governmentt adopted the Clean Water Act.

The Questions Presented give some additional background:

In 1970, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) entered into an agreement that gave the Petitioner‘s predecessor in interest, Nomikano, Inc., the right to fill certain wetlands on its property. In exchange, the government obtained a flowage easement over a portion of the property. Petitioner was Secretary-Treasurer of Nomikano and involved in those negotiations. In 2000, Petitioner obtained the property. Subsequently, in 2006, he sought a permit from the Corps…

Continue Reading New Cert Petition: Do Pre-Purchase Regulations Negate A Property Owner’s Expectations?

Here’s the Reply Brief, filed by the petitioner/property owner in Estate of Hage v. United States, No. 12-918 (cert. petition filed Jan. 17, 2013).

That’s the case in which the Federal Circuit held that a 22-year old takings case was not ripe because even though the agency denied Hage’s every application for a grazing permit, it might issue a special use permit that might allow the use of the water he alleges was taken. 

The issue in the case is whether it is a taking for the government to cut off physical access to a property owner’s vested right to use water. The Court of Federal Claims awarded $4.2 million in just compensation for the taking of Hage’s water rights. But the Federal Circuit reversed because the case was not ripe.

Here is the cert petition, here’s the federal government’s BIO, and here are the amicus briefs…

Continue Reading Final Brief In Western Water Rights Takings Case

Here’s the opinion of the California Court of Appeal (1st District) in an appeal we’ve been following, Lockaway Storage v. County of Alameda, No. A30874 (May 9, 2013), affirming that the County of Alameda is liable for a temporary regulatory taking under Penn Central, and awarding the property owners nearly three-quarters of a million in attorney fees.

The entire opinion is worth reviewing, but here’s the short story. Lockaway purchased agriculturally-zoned land in the East Bay area for use as a boat and RV storage facility, an alternate conditional use in ag-zoned land. For over a decade, the property had been used as such pursuant to a series of Conditional Use Permits. In 2000, however, the voters of the county approved an initiative which prohibited the development of storage facilties, unless approved by public vote. The ordinance contained a provision allowing “minimum development” if the prohibition would deprive…

Continue Reading Cal App Affirms Penn Central Temporary Regulatory Taking

Cle-logoFor those of you attending the Virginia Eminent Domain Conference, here’s the expanded papers on “Tough Takings Questions: Regulatory Takings, Zoning Issues and Judicial Takings” and Public Use issues.

Use the password provided at the conference to open the pdf’s. It’s the same p/w for both. If you forgot the password, email me.

For those who did not attend, sorry folks, there are some benefits to coming to a conference! Y’all are going to have to wait for a bit — after a decent interval to allow the attendees to get their money’s worth, we’ll remove the password.

For more about the cases and books we discussed yesterday during my presentation on “Virginia’s Place in National Eminent Domain Trends, check these out:

  • Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (gas station rent control, and the demise of the “substantially advance” test as a takings test).

     
    Continue Reading Materials From Today’s Virginia Eminent Domain Conference

    This just in: the Ninth Circuit has issued an opinion in MHC Financing Ltd P’ship v. City of San Rafael, No. 07-15983 (Apr. 17, 2013), reversing the District Court’s decision that the city’s mobilehome rent control ordinance was a taking under Penn Central.

    More, after a chance to review the opinion.

    MHC Financing Ltd. P’ship v. City of San Rafael, No. 07-15982 (9th Cir. Apr. 17, 2013)


    Continue Reading Ninth Circuit: No Penn Central Taking In Rent Control Ordinance

    As you know, the U.S. Supreme Court earlier reversed the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that government-induced flooding could not be a taking unless it was “permanent,” and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit for more.

    Although the Federal Circuit indicated it would have preferred to avoid trying to deal with the issue (its order establishing a briefing schedule on remand invited the parties “to consider mediation of the issues remaining in the case following the Supreme Court’s remand”), it looks like that’s not what is happening, because the parties have filed their briefs. 

    The briefs appy the multi-factor Penn Central-ish “factors and circumstances” set out by the Supreme Court: 

    • “[T]ime is indeed a factor in determining the existence vel non of a compensable taking” Was the flooding “temporary and unplanned” and a result of “exigent circumstances?”
    • “[T]he degree to which the invasion is

    …
    Continue Reading Arkansas Game On Remand From SCOTUS – First Briefs

    Koontz Sets The Stage

    The apparent sticking point during the January oral arguments in n Koontz v. St Johns River Water Mgmt Dist., No. 11-1447 (cert. granted Oct. 5, 2012), came to light via Justice Scalia’s questioning of the property owner’s counsel about whether anything had been “taken” when a property owner refused to accept a development permit conditioned on him paying for improvements to public land miles away from his property, because doing so would violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine of Nollan/Dolan. For how could the owner claim that his property was taken when he didn’t accept the permit? The issue was succintly stated by Justice Kagan when she asked point-blank, “where is the taking?” (see p. 11 of the Koontz transcript).

    We’re still waiting for the opinion in that case so don’t have the Court’s answer just yet, but Part II of the…

    Continue Reading Horne v. USDA Oral Argument Preview: Is It The Takings Clause, Or Only The Just Compensation Clause?

    Earlier, we posted the initial briefs in Big Oak Farms, Inc. v. United States, a case now pending in the Court of Federal Claims. Or, more correctly, perhaps being revived in the CFC because it was dismissed earlier.

    The property owner in Big Oak Farms is seeking compensation for the flooding of its land in 2011 after the Corps of Engineers blew up a levee on the Mississippi River in order to, in the plaintiff’s words, “sacrifice Plaintiffs’ land to superimposed water, sand, and gravel in order to benefit the public diverting high water away from other personal and real properties in and around Cairo, Illinois.” Video here.

    The Big Oak Farms briefs were the first briefs filed in which the parties attempted to apply the Supreme Court’s ruling in Arkansas Game and Fish Comm’n v. United States, No. 11-597 (Dec. 4, 2012). These were filed even…

    Continue Reading Response Briefs On Impact Of SCOTUS Flood Takings Opinion

    In Midwest Materials, Inc. v. Wilson, No. 84A04-1205-MI-258 (Feb. 27, 2013), the Indiana Court of Appeals held that Midwest did not suffer a taking for the loss of its property during the time a requirement that it provide water service to neighboring residences as a condition of a “special exception” needed to build a “molecular methane gas processing unit” on its own property was in force. The trial court eventually struck down the condition, and Midwest then alleged it suffered a temporary taking under Indiana law (only) for the time in which the permit condition was in effect.

    On the inverse condemnation claim, the trial court held that Midwest had not been deprived of use of its property, and the Court of Appeals affirmed under Indiana’s version of the multi-factor Penn Central test. “The trial court did not err when it concluded that the seventeen-month period from the time…

    Continue Reading Indiana App: No Temporary Taking In Seventeen-Month Loss Of Use