Here’s the cert petition in a case we’ve been following that presents a question that has divided the lower courts – do the nexus and rough proportionality tests for whether a land use exaction works a taking apply to exactions of cash, or are they limited to land exactions? In St. Johns River Water Management Dist v. Koontz, No. SC09-713 (Nov. 3, 2011), the Florida Supreme Court added to the lower court split when it held under both the U.S. and Florida Constitutions that the Nollan and Dolan tests are only applicable “where the condition/exaction sought by the government involves a dedication of or over the owner’s interest in real property in exchange for permit approval; and only when the regulatory agency actually issues the permit sought, thereby rendering the owner’s interest in the real property subject to the dedication imposed.”

The property owner has now sought U.S. Supreme

Continue Reading New Cert Petition: Nollan/Dolan Not Limited To Land Exactions

SCOTUSblog has picked the cert petition in Redevelopment Authority of the County of Montgomery, Pennsylvania v. R & J Holding Co.as its “Petition of the Day” —

Issue(s): (1) Whether issue preclusion bars a takings claim based on the Fifth Amendment only where the state court expressly decides Fifth Amendment issues or, additionally, where the state court decides the same takings claim under state takings law; and (2) whether, after a federal court’s dismissal of a takings claim under Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank and the assertion in state court of an England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Examiners reservation, a federal court — circumventing San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco and Williamson County — can rely on that reservation, notwithstanding its invalidity, in refusing to apply claim preclusion to bar the reasserted takings claim.

The case is

Continue Reading Petition Arguing That Distinguishing Williamson County Results In An “Unfair Procedural Trap For Condemning Authorities Is “Petition Of The Day”

We couldn’t post much last week due to a pressing engagement on Friday before a three-judge federal district court (the case challenging Hawaii’s latest state reapportionment plan on Equal Protection grounds in which we represent the plaintiffs — more here). But the court took the matter under submission, so while we are awaiting a ruling we can clear off some of the backlog of items.

First, you will recall R&J Holding Co. v. Redevelopment Authority of Montgomery County, 670 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. Dec. 9, 2011), a case we detailed here, in which the Third Circuit held that a property owner did not actually or impliedly litigate its federal takings claims in an earlier state court case, and thus actually allowed a property owner to raise its federal constitutional claims in federal court.

Apparently, a property owner even having a chance of vindicating its federal constitutional rights

Continue Reading Amicus Brief: Federal Takings Claims And State Law Claims … Ehh, What’s The Difference?

Here are the cases we discussed in this morning’s session at the Eminent Domain & Land Use in Hawaii seminar:

  • Brown v. Howard, No 26991 (June 21, 2011), the case in which the South Carolina Supreme Court held that an attorney’s services constitute property, and that property was taken when a trial court refused to let a court-appointed attorney withdraw from defending a criminal case, forcing him to work for a fee capped at $3,500. Here’s the Bar Association’s amicus brief on the issue.


Continue Reading Links From Today’s Eminent Domain Conference

The redevelopment authority of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania has filed this cert petition seeking review of the Third Circuit’s decision in R&J Holding Co. v. Redevelopment Authority of Montgomery County, 670 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. Dec. 9, 2011), a case we detailed here. In that case, the Third Circuit held that a property owner did not litigate its federal takings claims in an earlier state court case, and thus actually allowed a property owner to raise its federal constitutional claims in federal court. Imagine that.

The procedural facts of the various state and federal cases that we detailed in our post on the case are worth reading, since, unlike the usual case where the property owner loses its state law takings claim in its Williamson County-required journey to state court, here the property owner initially prevailed on its state law taking claim. In its first visit to state court, the property owner defeated the redevelopment authority’s attempt to condemn its land. The owner then instituted an inverse condemnation claim in federal court for its damages. The federal court dismissed under Williamson County, and the owner brought its inverse case in state court (and expressly did not litigate its federal claim by filing an England reservation), which agreed and awarded it damages.

The Pennsylvania appeals court reversed, concluding that Pennsylvania law does not recognize a right of a property owner who defeats a taking to seek damages other than attorneys fees and costs under Pennsylvania statutes. Having been denied compensation under state law and being told it was categorically barred from bringing a state law compensation claim, the owner went back to federal court to litigate its federal takings claim. The district court dismissed. But the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the property owner did not present its federal challenge to the state court, and the redevelopment authority waived any challenge to the England reservation by not objecting.

Here are the Questions Presented:

In San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005), this Court held that state court judgments in actions filed pursuant to Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), are entitled to preclusive effect on takings claims in a later federal action. The Court also held that this preclusive effect could not be “negate[d]” by asserting in the state court a purported “reservation,” under England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), of the right to press the same takings claim in federal court based on the Fifth Amendment. The questions presented are:

1. Whether issue preclusion bars a takings claim based on the Fifth Amendment only where the state court expressly decides Fifth Amendment issues or, additionally, where the state court decides the same takings claim under state takings law?

2. Whether, after a federal court’s dismissal of a takings claim under Williamson County, and the assertion in state court of an England reservation, a federal court—circumventing San Remo Hotel and Williamson County—can rely on that reservation, notwithstanding its invalidity, in refusing to apply claim preclusion to bar the reasserted takings claim?

This petition asks the Court to validate a the proposition that an England reservation is simply invalid in takings claims. See Petition at 27 (The Third Circuit’s “unprecedented use of Respondents’ invalid England reservation to circumvent claim preclusion has the same effect.”). The authority also argues that Williamson County requires a property owner to raise its federal claim in state court. Id. (“The Third Circuit’s decision thus threatens to become a template for encouraging (and permitting) adroit condemnees to refrain from asserting federal law arguments and authorities in state court …”).

Problem is, neither Williamson County nor San Remo can be read as aggressively as the redevelopment authority does in its petition. Williamson County does not require that a property owner bring her federal takings claim in state court, only that the state deny compensation under state law before the federal claim becomes ripe. And San Remo concluded that the property owner litigated its federal takings claim in the course of litigating its state compensation claim, effectively waiving its England reservation (“By broadening their state action beyond the mandamus petition to include their “substantially advances” claims, petitioners effectively asked the state court to resolve the same federal issues they asked it to reserve.”). In R & J Holding, the state appeals court concluded that Pennsylvania statutes do not permit a claim for compensation, and the property owner does not appear to have litigated the “functional equivalent” of a federal takings claim. 

Finally, get a load of this: the agency claming that this is all some unfair procedural machination by the property owner to pull the wool over its eyes and lure it into not objecting to the England reservation:

Beyond that, the Third Circuit’s decision also creates the possibility of an unfair procedural trap for condemning authorities. Given this Court’s clear directives in Allen and San Remo Hotel, condemning authorities rightly may see no need to object to asserted England reservations in state court Williamson County proceedings, which those authorities reasonably believe are invalid. Under the Third Circuit’s decision, however, the failure to object to such invalid England reservations would eliminate the authorities’ otherwise meritorious claim preclusion defense. Such a procedural trap is unfair and improper, and this Court should clarify in this case why it is flawed under settled precedent.

Petition at 27-28. And here it was that we believed it was only property owners who thought that Williamson CountySan Remo created unfair procedural traps. Come on government agencies this stuff isn’t hard according to Justice Souter, who thinks it is just a matter of a phone call or two.

Our prediction? Cert denied.

If the Court grants cert, however, this case may be an opportunity for a conditional cross petition asking the Court to revist the wisdom of Williamson County, an issue it was not asked to decide in San Remo: From the San Remo transcript:

Justice O’Connor: And you haven’t asked us to revisit that Williamson County case, have you?

Mr. Utrecht: We have not asked that this Court reconsider the decision in Williamson County.

Justice O’Connor: Maybe you should have.

Even so, the Catch-22 nature of the Williamson CountySan Remo trap prompted four Justices to note that the experiment in denying federal review to a federal constitutional claim may have run its course and is due for another look. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:

Finally, Williamson County‘s state-litigation rule has created some real anomalies, justifying our revisiting the issue… I joined the opinion of the Court in Williamson County. But further reflection and experience lead me to think that the justifications for its state-litigation requirement are suspect, while its impact on takings plaintiffs is dramatic… In an appropriate case, I believe the Court should reconsider whether plaintiffs asserting a Fifth Amendment takings claim based on the final decision of a state or local government entity must first seek compensation in state courts.

Is R & J Holding the “appropriate case?” We’ll be following the case to see. Follow the Court’s docket page here. Our thanks to Gideon Kanner for passing this along.
Continue Reading New Cert Petition: Distinguishing Williamson County Results In An “Unfair Procedural Trap For Condemning Authorities

How hard is it for the government to obtain a Williamson County dismissal that a federal takings claim is not ripe for federal court reivew? Not too hard, says Justice Souter.

Justice Souter? But wait, didn’t he retire, you ask? Recall that Supreme Court justices who retire from the Court don’t really “retire” in the sense that they may continue to sit and hear cases in the federal courts of appeals. Justice O’Connor has done so, and Justice Souter did so in Efron v. Mora Dev. Corp., No. 11-1347 (Mar. 26, 2012, a case from the First Circuit involving a claim for a regulatory taking in Puerto Rico.

The Puerto Rico highway department condemned Efron’s land, and although he objected, the Commonwealth court transferred ownership and possession to the department. Efron then went to federal court on civil rights claims against the department and Mora Development, alleging that they

Continue Reading Justice Souter: Dismissal Under Williamson County Is So Easy, A Caveman Could Do It

It’s always a safe bet to predict that the Supreme Court will decline to review a case. Statistics, after all, are on the side of “cert denied” regardless of the substantive merits of a case.

But there are some cases, like Harmon v. Kimmel, No. 11-496 (cert. petition filed Oct. 17, 2011), the case challenging New York City’s residential rent control law as a taking (briefs here), that give you pause because they take a slightly different track: the respondents waived their right to respond, the Court invited them to file a BIOthe conference gets moved to April 20. Things like this make you go “hmmmmm.”

Well, the drama was for naught. Today, the Court issued the order denying cert. On one hand, it’s not surprising since the weight of statistics is never favorable, and from a practical standpoint, the Court might be reluctant to wade

Continue Reading Cert Denied In NY Rent Control Challenge

Last Friday, we noted that the Supreme Court was scheduled to consider whether to accept cert in Harmon v. Kimmel, No. 11-496 (cert. petition filed Oct. 17, 2011), the case challenging New York City’s residential rent control law as a taking, among other things.

However, according to the Court’s docket report this morning, the Court put off the decision for another week, rescheduling consideration until the April 20, 2012 conference. Does this mean that someone up there is interested? The same Justice or Justices who asked for briefs in response? That there is a titanic behind-the-scenes struggle between the Justices to get that fourth vote? The cert pool clerk was out sick last week?

We don’t know, but we sure are intrigued. Continue Reading Not So Fast…

Most likely, by the time you read this, the Supreme Court will have decided whether to grant cert in Harmon v. Kimmel, No. 11-496 (cert. petition filed Oct. 17, 2011), the case challenging New York City’s residential rent control law as a taking, among other things. Today, you see, is the day the Court is scheduled to hold its conference to decide whether to do so.

We mere mortals won’t know what the result of the conference is until next week, of course, but we thought we’d get you ready. Use the time to review the key briefs:


Continue Reading Conference Day For New York Rent Control Challenge

Our Cincinnati colleague Matt Fellerhoff has posted his thoughts on an interesting case from the Ohio Supreme Court, Clifton v. Village of Blanchester, No. CA2009-07-009 (Mar. 1, 2012). The case involves whether an owner whose property is located outside village limits can bring a takings case against the village. The Ohio Supreme Court held it could not. Why, you ask? Because the village could not exercise eminent domain to take the property, the property owner cannot bring a regulatory takings case against the village. Matt writes:

Even more problematic is the holding in the syllabus, that since Blanchester did not have the authority to condemn property outside of village limits, the remedy sought, an order from the court that Blanchester file an eminent domain action against Clifton to pay for the damage to his property (the only remedy for inverse condemnation under Ohio law), was insufficient and therefore, the

Continue Reading Ohio: Owner Whose Property Is Outside Village Limits Can’t Bring A Takings Claim