Vested rights

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There’s apparently a huge backlog in California of liens which workers’ comp medical providers file to seek payment for services they’ve provided to injured workers.

These are liens possessed by service providers for workers whose employers declined to provide treatment on the ground it is not work related. In those cases, the worker may seek treatment on her own, and if the injury is later determined to be covered by workers’ comp, the employer is liable for payment. The service provider cannot seek payment from the injured employee, and is limited to filing a lien on the workers’ comp case. The lien filing gives the provider standing in the workers’ comp case to protect its interests. The rights of a lien holder are contingent on the worker prevailing on her claim that the injury is work-related.  

In response to the huge backlog in processing such liens, the legislature adopted…

Continue Reading 9th Circuit: Fee To “Activate” Workers’ Comp Lien Not A Taking – The Liens Are Not Property

In AFT Michigan v. State of Michigan, No. 148748 (Apr. 8, 2015), the Michigan Supreme Court upheld a state statute which mandated a 3% reduction in public school employees’ salaries (to fund a failing school employee retiree health care system), and concluded it was not a taking because it was a voluntary giving by the employees. They were not required after all, to provide the 3% contribution, and could avoid the reduction and maintain their present salary levels by opting out of their own publicly-funded retirement health care.

There’s a lot more to the statute and the unanimous opinion of course — including a rejection of a Contracts Clause claim — but the heart of the takings analysis starts on page 21:

Voluntary healthcare contributions do not violate Const 1963, art 10, § 2 and US Const, Ams V and XIV because, as a general proposition, the government does…

Continue Reading Michigan: Voluntary “Giving” By Public School Employees To Fund Failing Retiree Health Benefits Is Not A Taking

Alderwoods

Here’s the amici brief on behalf of Central Oregon Builders Association, Oregonians in Action, and Owners’ Counsel of America in a case being considered by the Oregon Supreme Court, State of Oregon v. Alderwoods (Oregon), Inc., No. S062766. 

In an eminent domain action to improve Highway 99W in Tigard, Oregon, the DOT condemned Alderwoods’ two driveways, which had been in place since the 1930’s, which provided direct access to and from the property to the highway (approximate location red arrow). After it filed the action, however, the DOT purported to administratively eliminate the driveways because they were too close to the 99W/217 intersection to be safe. The trial court agreed with the DOT that the post-condemnation elimination meant that Alderwoods did not have a property interest in the two direct access driveways. The court prohibited Alderwoods from presenting evidence to the jury of the loss of value to its …

Continue Reading Amici Brief: Property Owners Have Right Of Direct Access To Highways That Can’t Be Regulated Away

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision in Somers USA, LLC v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Transportation, No. 2014AP1092 (Mar. 25, 2015), is the second case we’re posting today that has us asking — just what was the government thinking?

This kerfuffle resulted from the DOT trying to take advantage of Somers’ scrivener’s error, made when Somers recorded a map (known as a “CSM”) that stated it was “dedicating” some of its property for a future state highway, rather than merely “reserving” it for highway use. No one disputed that this was an error, and no one doubted that Somers had not intended to donate its property for the highway. 

But the DOT said “thank you very much,” and it went ahead and built its highway without condemning the land or paying compensation.

Somers’ inverse condemnation claim followed, as you might expect. The DOT conceded that the “dedication” language was “no doubt…

Continue Reading What Were They Thinking, Part II: DOT Can’t Take Advantage Of “Scrivener’s Error” To Avoid Eminent Domain

Thankfully, the only “Tiki Island” we have in Hawaii is a miniature golf course. Because the name “tiki” should be reserved for such things, or for kitschy bars, or Trader Vic-knockoffs.

And please, honest-to-goodness real municipalities should never be named Tiki Island. No matter how nice they appear to be. Just no.

(Martin Denny, by the way, gets a pass – rock on, Mr. Denny.)

But there it is, the Village of Tiki Island, Texas, population 968, “a waterfront community in Galveston County consisting of about 960 homes, with approximately 40% full-time occupants, and 60% part-time occupants.” 

Something tells us that TI, TX’s smallish population and the resident-to-part-timers ratio had something to do with the fact that in 2014, the Village adopted an ordinance prohibiting the short-term rental of residences, an activity that apparently had been ongoing for some time…

Continue Reading Tiki Island’s Prohibition Of Vacation Rentals A Penn-Central Taking (For Now)

Check out State ex rel. Sunset Estate Properties, LLC v. Village of Lodi, No. 2013-1856 (Mar. 10, 2015),  a case in which the Ohio Supreme Court held that a local zoning ordinance was unconstitutional on its face.

The Village’s zoning code, adopted in 1987, banned manufactured home (trailer) parks. Of course, the ordinance could not ban those parks already in existence, which were allowed as nonconforming uses. Sunset Estates was one such park.

The ordinance also provided that if a nonconforming use was discontinued for six months, that was evidence of the owner’s intent to abandon the nonconforming use:

Whenever a nonconforming use has been discontinued for a period of six months or more, such discontinuance shall be considered conclusive evidence of an intention to legally abandon the nonconforming use. At the end of the six-month period of abandonment, the nonconforming use shall not be re-established, and any further…

Continue Reading A Zoning Due Process Violation From The Land Of Euclid: Owner Can’t Lose Nonconforming Use By Actions Of Tenant

Last we checked in with the Bridge Aina Lea case, the Ninth Circuit said it would hold off on a decision until the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled in the associated state court litigation (see 9th Cir Says “Let’s Wait” On Hawaii Supreme Court To Rule In Bridge Aina Lea).

This is the federal court side of a case in which a developer is suing the State Land Use Commission (and certain Commissioners in their individual capacities) after the LUC reclassified its land on the Big Island from urban to agricultural use. Aina Lea filed two actions in state court: an administrative appeal under the administrative procedures act, and an original jurisdiction civil rights complaint. The defendants removed the latter action to federal court. The District Court, however, abstained. After oral arguments in the Ninth Circuit, the panel withdrew the case from submission to allow the Hawaii Supreme Court…

Continue Reading 9th Cir: No Need For Pullman Abstention In Aina Lea After Hawaii Supreme Court Ruling

Here’s that last case in our 2014 opinion queue, from way back in July. It’s also coincidentially the 2,500th post on the blog.

In Sawn Beach  Corolla, LLC v,.County of Currituck, No. COA13-1272 (July 1, 2014), the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered vested rights and takings claims in a fact pattern than streched back decades. 

In 1966, the owners purchased 1400 acres for residential development. In 1969, the owners recorded a subdivision plat, to make both residential and commerical uses. The county had no zoning ordinance in place at that time. The owners spent $425,000 on preliminary work and infrastructure, such as surveying, engineering and grading. Big bucks in 1960’s dollars.

The county adopted a zoning ordinance in 1971, zoning the property for “RO2,” which prohibits most businesses, including those contemplated by the owners. “Nevertheless, plaintiffs continued to believe that they would be allowed to commerically develop their…

Continue Reading Our Final 2014 Opinion Post: Vested Rights In North Carolina

There’s one citation notably missing from the opinion of the Texas Court of Appeals in Anderton v. City of Cedar Hill, No. 05-12-00969-CV (Aug. 22, 2014): Williamson County.  

This was case where in response to the city’s petition that the Anderdons’ use of their property was illegal, they counterclaimed that they had nonconforming use rights, that the city’s petition violated their vested rights, and resulted in a taking of their property. The trial court granted the city summary judgment on the counterclaim, holding that the owners did not present evidence of their nonconforming use status, and that their inverse condemnation claim was not ripe because they had not pursued available administrative remedies under the zoning code.

The court of appeals reversed. It concluded that the owners did submit enough evidence to get past a summary judgment motion that their use was nonconforming. Most interestingly for our purposes…

Continue Reading Williamson County Wonderfully MIA In Texas Court’s Ripeness Analysis

Continuing our year-end opinion rush, here’s Thaw v. Moser, No. 14-40108 (Oct. 9, 2014).

Mr. Thaw sought bankruptcy protection. As part of the process, the trustee was going to sell the house he owned with Mrs. Thaw, who was not bankrupt, and claimed a homestead exemption. 

The Fifth Circuit rejected Mrs. Thaw’s claim that selling her interest in the house was a taking. Before 2005, the bankruptcy code allowed a non-debtor spouse to have a compensable interest in a home jointly-owned with the debtor. But amendments to the code in 2005 capped and eliminated the homestead exemption. And since the Thaws purchased their home after 2005, Mrs. Thaw did not have a vested right that was taken.

The court rejected the argument that in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), the Supreme Court eliminated the “notice” argument:

Palazzolo’s narrow exception has no application here.

Continue Reading Fifth Circuit: Forced Sale Of Home In Bankruptcy Not A Taking Because Bankruptcy Law Preceded Purchase